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Abstract — Data Warehouse (DWH) provides storage for huge amounts of historical data from heterogeneous 
operational sources in the form of multidimensional views, thus supplying sensitive and useful information which 
help decision-makers to improve the organization’s business processes. A data warehouse environment must ensure 
that data collected and stored in one big repository are not vulnerable. A review of security approaches specifically for 
data warehouse environment and issues concerning each type of security approach have been provided in this paper. 
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1 Introduction 
In today’s competitive business environment, 
organizations need to collaborate with each other and 
track their performance for market trend analysis. With 
the help of advances in computer and network 
technology, organizations stores, collect, and analyze 
vast amounts of data efficiently and quickly. Data are 
analyzed by the organization not only for market trend 
identification, but also to examine the effectiveness of 
their activities and to make decisions that affect their 
bottom line. Therefore, data management has become 
crucial because organizations not only need to store and 
retrieve data, but also need to derive meaningful 
information from it. As a consequence, organizations 
have come to depend more on knowledge management 
technologies such as interoperable knowledge 
management, knowledge repositories, and data 
warehouses (DWH). 
A data warehouse may contain massive amounts of 
organizational data such as financial information, credit 
card numbers, organization trade secrets, and personal 
data, thus they are vulnerable to cyber attack [1]. A 
DWH must ensure that sensitive data does not fall into 
the wrong hands when data are consolidated into one 
big repository and become an easy target for malicious 
outside or inside attackers. Many published security 
statistics show that the number of attacks on data is 
increasing continuously [2]. Data security focusses 
mainly on three issues: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, these concepts are also know by the 
acronym CIA.  
 
Confidentiality emphasizes protection of 
information from unauthorized disclosure, either by 
indirect logical inference or by direct retrieval [3]. 
Integrity involves data protection from accidental or 
malicious changes such as false data insertion, 
contamination, or destruction. Availability ensures that 
data are accessible to all authorized users at any time. 
In the past, many data security solutions for databases 
have been proposed.  
Although available solutions have been proven to be 
scientifically effective, they are infeasible or at least 
inefficient for a DWH environment because this 
environment requires specific performance. Most of 
today’s DWH security solutions lack effective security 
procedures to protect the data accessed through them. 
Existing security methods can be best for restricting 
security breaches, but cannot completely eliminate the 
risk. 
In this paper, we present a survey of the security 
approaches available for DWHs and the issues 
concerning each type of security approach. The 
remainder of the paper is organized into two sections. 
In Section 2, various existing data security solutions for 
DWHs are presented, and specific issues in the DWH 
environment are discussed. Finally, Section 3 concludes 
the paper and highlights future research directions. 
 
2. Security Approaches for DWH 
A DWH is an integral part of an organization and 
empowers its users by enabling them to retrieve 
information about the business process as a whole. 
According to Devbandu [4], security is an important 
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requirement for DWH development, starting from 
requirements and continuing through implementation 
and maintenance. Security solutions for on-line 
transactional processing (OLTP) systems cannot be 
appropriate for DWHs because in OLTP, security 
controls are applied on rows, columns, or tables, while 
DWHs need to be accessed by different numbers of 
users for different content because multidimensionality 
is a basic principle of a DWH [1, 5].  
Data extraction, transformation, cleaning, and 
preparation have all been done before the data are 
loaded into the DWH. Security concerns must be 
addressed at all layers of a DWH system. Moreover, 
DWH security cannot be ensured unless the security of 
the underlying operating system and the network have 
been addressed [6]. Various security solutions have 
been proposed in the DWH literature and are described 
below, categorized according to how they address basic 
security concerns such as CIA. 
 
2.1 DWH Security Approaches for 
Confidentiality Issues 
Confidentiality emphasizes protection of information 
from unauthorized disclosure, either by indirect logical 
inference or by direct retrieval [3]. In order to address 
DWH confidentiality concerns, many approaches have 
been proposed dealing with access control. Access-
control mechanisms involve controlling both invocation 
and administration of the DWH and the source 
databases. Authentication and audit mechanisms also 
fall under access control and must be installed in a 
DWH environment.  
Conventionally, DWHs have been accessed by high-
level users such as business analysts and executive 
management. Therefore, critical access-control issues 
also arise at the front end of a DWH. Most DWH or 
OLAP vendors assume that there is no need to provide 
fine-grained access-control support for a DWH front 
end because it hinders discovery of analytical 
information. However, this assumption is not 
appropriate because many users can access analytical 
tools to query the DWH. Front-end DWH applications 
can provide both static and dynamic reporting. 
Imposing access control on static reports is not a 
problem because it can be defined on a report basis. For 
dynamic reporting like data-mining queries, it is 
difficult to provide appropriate access-control policies. 
This leads to the problem of data inference; for 
example, a user may not be authorized to obtain 
particular information, but may retrieve it through an 
aggregated query.  
 
2.2 DWH Security Approaches for Integrity  
Integrity involves data protection from accidental or 
malicious changes such as false data insertion, 
contamination, or destruction. The disadvantage of 
access-control mechanisms is that they do not capture 
inferences on data in the case of an aggregated OLAP 
query. Inferences on data lead to the integrity issue. For 
more than thirty years, inference-control approaches 
have been studied in statistical and census databases [7, 
8, 9]. The proposed approaches can be categorized into 
restriction-based and perturbation-based techniques. 
Restriction-based inference control techniques simply 
deny unsafe queries to prevent malicious inference. 
Perturbation techniques add noise to data, swap data, or 
modify the original data and can also apply data 
modification to each query dynamically. The 
approaches presented to solve the integrity issue can be 
classified further as described below.  
 
2.2.1 Restriction-based approaches 
In restriction-based inference-control techniques, the 
safety of a query is determined based on the maximum 
number of values aggregated by dissimilar queries [8], 
the minimum number of values aggregated by a query 
[10], and the highest rank of the matrix expressing 
answered queries [11].  
Micro-aggregation and partitioning considers 
specific type of aggregations. In partitioning methods, a 
partition is defined on sensitive data, and a restriction is 
applied on a complete block of a partition for aggregate 
queries [12, 13]. Micro-aggregation also replaces 
cluster averages with their sensitive values [14]. Both 
methods are not based on dimensional hierarchies and 
therefore may contain meaningless blocks that are not 
useful for users. 
 
2.2.2 Combined Access- and Inference-Control 
Approaches 
In order to remove security threats, access control and 
inference control together can provide a good solution. 
Ensuring security should not affect the usefulness of 
DWH and OLAP systems. Wand & Jajodia [15] 
proposed a three-tier security architecture for a DWH. 
Usually, two tiers can be found in statistical databases, 
such as sensitive data and aggregation queries. This 
two-tier architecture has some inherent drawbacks: 
inference checking during run-time query processing 
may result in unacceptable delays, and also under this 
two-tier architecture, inference-control techniques 
cannot benefit from the special characteristics of 
OLAP. To overcome these drawbacks, the research has 
defined a three-tier architecture to provide access 
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control between the first and second tiers and inference 
control between the second and third tiers.  
The basic lattice-based inference method [16] can be 
used and implemented on the three-tier inference-
control model. The first methodology used existing 
inference-control methods for statistical databases, 
whereas the second methodology was designed to 
remove the limitations of existing inference-control 
methods. The work claims that both methods could be 
applied on the basis of a three-tier inference control 
architecture that is more appropriate for DWH and 
OLAP systems specifically. 
 
2.2.3 Modelling-based Approaches to DWH Security 
Triki et al. [17] proposed approach provides semi-
automatic inference detection at the DWH design level. 
The approach presented consists of three phases. The 
first phase identifies sensitive data from DWH 
schemata with the collaboration of security designers 
and experts in the field. In the second phase, an 
inference graph based on a class diagram is constructed 
to detect elements which may cause inferences in 
future. The security designer also distinguishes between 
elements leading to precise and partial inferences. 
Precise inference means that exact information is 
disclosed, whereas partial inference leads only to partial 
disclosure of information.  
    The inference graph consists of a set of nodes 
representing the data. Then nodes are connected to each 
other by oriented arcs representing the direction of 
inference and its type (partial or precise). In the third 
phase, DWH schemata are enriched automatically by 
UML annotations which flag the elements that may 
lead to both types of inferences. The work claimed that 
their approach had two advantages: independence of 
the data domain, and use of available data to detect 
inferences.  
 
2.2.4 Data Masking and Perturbation-Based 
Security Approaches 
Data disclosure can be easily avoided by data-masking 
approaches. Using data masking, original data values 
can be replaced or changed. Currently, the best 
practices for data masking are used by Oracle in their 
DBMS [18]. In data masking, encryption is an 
advanced form of enforcing privacy. Oracle has also 
developed Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) in the 
10g and 11g versions of its DBMS. TDE incorporates 
the well-known AES and 3DES encryption algorithms 
[19, 20].  
Santos et al. [21] proposed a data-masking 
technique for data warehouses consisting only of 
numerical values. The proposed approach was based on 
mathematical modulus operators such as division, 
remainder, and two simple arithmetic operations, which 
can be used without changing DBMS source code and 
user applications. They claimed that the proposed 
formula required low computational effort and that as a 
result, query response-time overheads became 
relatively small while still providing an appropriate 
security level. 
 
2.3 DWH Security Approaches for the 
Availability Issues 
Data availability is of utmost importance in any DWH 
system. This involves data recovery from real-time 
corruption or incorrect data modification and 
continuous 24/7 user access. Data replication is 
performed to be able to restore damaged data using 
many proposed solutions. In this way, database 
downtime because of maintenance interventions can 
also be avoided, and query-processing efforts can be 
divided, avoiding data-access hotspots. Well-known 
RAID architectures can be used for mirroring data [22, 
23] on systems where centralized servers contain the 
database. However, organizations have been 
implementing their DWHs in low-cost machines for 
cost-optimization purposes. RAID technology is not 
suitable for this kind of situation because typically only 
one disk drive is present.  
In today’s market, commercial solutions for the 
DWH data-availability issue are available, such as 
Oracle RAC [24] and Aster Data [25]. Hamming codes 
provide another approach to recover corrupted data 
using error-correction codes. The proposed data-storage 
system makes it possible to recover corrupted data 
blocks by using error-correcting codes, remapping bad 
blocks, and replicating blocks [26, 27]. Marsh & 
Schneider [28] proposed a technique for distributed 
storage used the same features as described earlier plus 
encryption methods. Other researchers [29, 30, 31, 32, 
33] have also proposed architecture assessment and 
self-healing methods to address the availability issue. 
Recently, Darwish et al. [34] have establish cloud-
based protocols to defend against denial-of-services 
attacks. 
 
3 Discussion 
A literature review of the various approaches to DWH 
security has been presented above. A DWH needs 
powerful security features in addition to its normal 
functionalities. The primary security requirements are 
summarized by the Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability (CIA) acronym. A full set of security 
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features can be defined under these three basic 
properties, such as access control, inference control, 
non-repudiation, authentication, authorization, and 
availability. The best security model is one that 
provides end-to-end security in all phases of DWH, 
starting from modelling and continuing through 
implementation and maintenance. Moreover, the 
security model must address the three basic CIA 
security requirements. Some of these approaches 
consider security requirement confidentiality.  
Security approaches which discussed integrity issues 
were further classified by how they address this type of 
security concern. Some of the approaches also tried to 
address the issue of DWH availability. In short, all the 
proposed approaches addressed only some aspects of 
security, and a DWH security model are needed that 
covers all the security requirements and also help in 
developing a secure DWH. The identified issues with 
security approaches in DWHs are listed below: 
 
a) Proper identification of security policies is a highly 
critical starting point in implementing security in a 
DWH. 
b) Most of the approaches used standard encryption 
methods and tried to provide strong data privacy. 
However, use of this type of encryption method 
makes them inefficient for DWH use. Encryption 
algorithms like AES and 3DES require large 
computational effort and have a huge impact on 
performance. A technique is therefore needed that 
provides strong data privacy with less computational 
effort and also maintains high performance, which is 
the basic requirement of DWH use. 
c) A method is also needed that specifically addresses 
the DWH availability issue. It will improve existing 
data-recovery methods to repair or restore corrupted 
data quickly, efficiently, and effectively. 
d) Evaluation methods for DWH security are also 
needed. None of the approaches examined addresses 
the issue of how one can assess the maturity level of 
security in a DWH. 
e) Confidentiality, data integrity, and availability are 
also basic requirements for DWH security. A 
combination of the approaches discussed above 
could be helpful in providing a solution to this 
problem. 
f) Most of the approaches are domain-dependent, not 
generic, or are somehow constraints-based. 
g) A DWH security maintenance mechanism is needed 
that takes specific security requirements into 
consideration and applies them appropriately. 
h) A model is needed that helps to identify security 
requirements automatically throughout the DWH 
life cycle and makes it possible to provide proper 
authentication.  
None of the existing approaches addressed this 
issue. The proper identification of security policies 
is a highly critical starting point in implementing 
security in a DWH. 
i) Most of the approaches used standard encryption 
methods and tried to provide strong data privacy. 
However, use of this type of encryption method 
makes them inefficient for DWH use. Encryption 
algorithms like AES and 3DES require large 
computational effort and have a huge impact on 
performance. A technique is therefore needed that 
provides strong data privacy with less computational 
effort and also maintains high performance, which is 
the basic requirement of DWH use. 
 
In order to provide DWH security, the real goal is to 
protect data Security and to preserve an appropriate 
level of privacy requirements must be considered in all 
layers of the system involved. No efforts have been 
made until now to integrate security into the complete 
DWH development cycle. Some approaches consider 
security requirements in the early stages of the DWH 
development life cycle. More efforts have been put in 
logical modelling of DWH security requirements, but 
they have not provided any tool support for 
implementing the modelled security requirements 
automatically in the target DWH system. A holistic 
approach of security throughout the software life cycle 
[35], may also benefit from a neuro-fuzzy framework 
[36, 37] - like it has been applied to other application 
domains. 
4. Conclusion  
This study has provided a literature review of existing 
DWH security solutions, discussing their issues and 
their impact on DWH scalability and performance 
requirements. It has become apparent that the proposed 
solutions are infeasible or inefficient for use in DWH 
environments. A DWH requires specific functionality 
with tight scalability and performance requirements. A 
complete solution is therefore needed that makes it 
possible to address these directives. DWH security is an 
active research relevance to any industrial project. 
Further research in DWH security is needed to address 
the issues discussed above because many more aspects 
remain to be considered, and there many open 
questions to be answered. 
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